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Introduction
This executive summary briefly describes the overall
goals and content of the report on safety considerations for
intensity modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) and is
intentionally limited in length and content. Please see the
full report published electronically at www.practicalradonc.
org. This abridged version is not intended to replace the full
length report but rather to highlight key recommendations
of the report. Background information for those less
familiar with IMRT is limited to the full report.Scope of this document on patient safety for IMRT
This report is part of a series of white papers addressing
patient safety commissioned by the American Society for
Radiation Oncology (ASTRO) Board of Directors as part
of ASTRO's Target Safely Campaign. The full length
document was approved by the ASTRO Board of
Directors on February 14, 2011 and has been endorsed
by the American Association of Physicists in Medicine,
American Association of Medical Dosimetrists, and the
American Society of Radiologic Technologists. The
document has also been reviewed and accepted by the
American College of Radiology’s Commission on Radi-
ation Oncology. These organizations have a long history
of supporting efforts toward improving patient safety in
the United States.
This report is related to other reports of the ASTRO
white paper series on patient safety, still in preparation,
especially those on peer review and on image-guided
radiation therapy, since both of these areas have
implications on the practice of IMRT. There are sectionsof the report that defer to guidance that will be published
by those groups in future reports. Because this is the first
report in the safety series, some of the concerns included in
this report are not limited to IMRT.
IMRT provides increased capability to conform isodose
distributions to the shape of the target(s), thereby reducing
dose to some adjacent critical structures. This promise of
IMRT is one of the reasons for its widespread use.
However, the promise of IMRT is counterbalanced by the
complexity of the IMRT planning and delivery processes,
and the associated risks.
The New York Times reported on serious accidents
involving both IMRT and other radiation treatment
modalities.1,2 The full length report broadly addresses
safe delivery of IMRT, with a primary focus on
recommendations for human error prevention and methods
to reduce the occurrence of errors or machine malfunctions
that can lead to catastrophic failures or errors.
The full treatment team should be composed of
individuals with proper credentials and training specific
to radiation therapy for the simulation, treatment planning,
quality assurance (QA), and delivery processes. Additional
training specific to IMRT is important. See the full length
report (section 1.2, available online only at www.
practicalradonc.org) for a description of the responsibili-
ties of IMRT team members, including radiation oncolo-
gists, medical physicists, dosimetrists (or treatment
planners), radiation therapists, and administrative staff.
Special attention should be paid to the roles of the
physician and physicist; both board certified medical
specialists who share responsibility for IMRT quality.Safety concerns
Tools and techniques that can be used by individual
clinics to reassess and strengthen the safety of their IMRT
programs are presented in the full length document. Due to
the complexity of IMRT delivery, we believe it is unsafe
for IMRT to be delivered in emergent situations that would
encourage staff to skip the needed QA steps. And yet,
clinical pressures can make it difficult to ensure support for
this approach.
Hazards within an IMRT program can be broadly
categorized as environmental or technical. Environmental
concerns that can affect all patient treatments include the
lack of standard operating procedures, haste, habituation,
incomplete understanding or misuse of procedures or
equipment, an inadequate QA program, and a lack of
continuing staff education. While these hazards are not
unique to IMRT, their impact may be greater due to the
complexity of IMRT. Technical concerns that affect safety
can include inadequate commissioning of the clinical
IMRT program, inadequate validation of the accuracy of
treatment delivery parameters, improper use of one or
more parts of the planning and delivery process, and an
MD:  Consult and Decision to Treat with IMRT
MD + Simulator Therapists (with Dosimetrist/Physicist as needed):
Patient Immobilization and Simulation
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ment plan parameters and QA results.
The responsibilities of members of the treatment team
are defined in the report (see Table 2 in the full document;
available online only at www.practicalradonc.org). Also,
specific example process steps are presented for workflow
(Appendix 1 in full document; available online only at
www.practicalradonc.org) and checklists (Appendix 2;
available online only at www.practicalradonc.org), which
may address ways to prevent or detect catastrophic
failures for IMRT. The 54 process steps and 15 hand-offs
between the personnel in the example workflow illustrate
the critical need for clearly defined roles, and unambig-
uous or robust hand-offs (and means of communication)
between personnel.MD + Dosimetrists:  Segmentation
MD: Review/Approval of
Segmentation
MD:  Written Directive to Dosimetrist
MD Review/Approval of
Treatment Plan
Peer Review (e.g. Volumes, Doses, etc.)*
Dosimetrist:  Create Treatment Plan using
MD’s Directive
Physicist Review of
Treatment Plan
Dosimetrist:  Download Approved Treatment Plan to
          Treatment Management System
Physicist Review of Downloaded Treatment
Plan and IMRT Pre-Treatment QA
Therapist Review of Treatment
Plan and Patient Set-Up Before Day 1
Therapists Set-Up Patient for Daily Treatment (with
Dosimetrist/Physicist as needed)
MD: Monitors Patient
during Treatment Course
Physicist: Reviews at start and
at least every 5 Fractions the Quality
of Patient Treatment
Figure 1 An abbreviated diagram of the process (boxes) and
review (ovals) steps for intensity modulated radiation therapy
planning for an individual patient. Each color (or shade)
represents member of the treatment team. *Peer review will be
addressed in detail in a report of the white paper series on
patient safety.Supporting a culture of safety for IMRT:
environmental considerations
The departmental leadership establishes the foundation
for patient safety and teamwork. While these elements are
not unique to IMRT, we believe that they are crucial for
ensuring a safe radiation therapy program, especially since
IMRT requires additional equipment, personnel, and
procedures for safety. The following considerations
(discussed in detail in the full length document available
online only at www.practicalradonc.org) are important for
creation of a culture of safety:
• Department members must trust each other3
• Administration must provide strong support for
safety
• Event tracking, review, investigation, and follow-up
for events and near misses
• Appropriately qualified personnel and ongoing
training
• Use of standard operating procedures (SOPs)
• Defined roles and responsibilities for team members
• Strong communication among team members
• American College of Radiology /ASTRO practice
accreditation
• Continuous quality improvements.
Each institution should customize procedures to reflect
their own processes and resources but should have a basis
founded in national or international guidance documents
(section 4) to create a program that explicitly incorporates
patient safety. SOPs should be written and should
empower individuals to halt planning or treatment
when a problem is encountered, allowing for proper
investigation into the problem, and then a decision
regarding the best course of action to maintain patient
safety. In the midst of a situation where adequate time is
not allowed for performing all of the necessary QA steps
prior to treatment, time pressures may stand in the way ofidentifying and resolving problems. The SOP should not
permit staff to skip QA steps.
Implementation of and adherence to detailed policies
and procedures are necessary to avoid both quality errors
and catastrophic failures. Details of what should be
included in an IMRT SOP are in the full length document
(available online only at www.practicalradonc.org).
Figure 1 shows the complexity of the IMRT process
as a series of process steps and review steps by members
Table 4 Recommendations to guard against catastrophic failures for IMRT
Recommended tests and procedures Person who performs task Primary review
responsibility
Second review
Halt a procedure if the operator is unclear about what is
being done.
All All All
Verify the patient information, treatment site, and prescription. All All All
Verify correct positioning of the high dose region of
isodose plan relative to targets.
Dosimetrist Physician Physicist
Verify the recording of reference and shift information from
the planning scan in patient chart (electronic or paper).
Dosimetrist Physicist Therapist
Assess pretreatment localization/portal images with respect
to corresponding reference images before first treatment;
physician determines frequency of IGRT techniques.
Dosimetrist exports
reference images from
treatment planning system
Physician Therapist
Verify that the correct version of the patient's treatment
plan is approved, sent to treatment management system,
and used for patient-specific QA.
Dosimetrist exports from
the treatment planning
system
Physicist Therapists confirm
against prescription
for each treatment;
physician prescription
should specify
the physician
approved plan
Before the first treatment or for any change in treatment,
perform patient-specific QA to guarantee that data
transfer between systems is correct before patient
treatment begins.
Physicist, dosimetrist,
therapist or physics
assistant
Physicist Therapists confirm
that only fully
approved plans are
used for treatment
Perform a complete chart check including review of
information in treatment management system prior to
the start of any treatment and after any change in
treatment before changes are used for treatment.
Visually review field apertures in treatment
management system.
Perform a check of dose to verify TPS calculation
(measurement or calculation using DICOM export
of data from RTP system).
Physicist Therapist
Perform a time out prior to treatment delivery. Therapist Second
therapist
Perform a check of treatment parameters before start of
and during first treatment against a fixed version of the
treatment plan.
Includes visual verification of field apertures during
first treatment and after any change in treatment.
At each fraction, verify motion of leaves (if MLC
delivery) and total monitor units.
Dosimetrist exported from
TPS; verified by physicist
Therapist Second therapist
Perform end-to-end testing to guarantee transfer of data
among all systems involved in imaging, planning and
dose delivery (periodically and after any software or
hardware changes).
Physicist, therapist, or
physics assistant
Physicist Second physicist
to review
Perform a time out prior to treatment delivery. Therapist Second
therapist
Perform a check of treatment parameters before start of and
during first treatment against a fixed version of the
treatment plan.
Includes visual verification of field apertures during
first treatment and after any change in treatment.
Dosimetrist exported from
TPS; verified by physicist
Therapist Second therapist
(continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued)
Recommended tests and procedures Person who performs task Primary review
responsibility
Second review
At each fraction, verify motion of leaves
(if MLC delivery) and total monitor units.
Perform end-to-end testing to guarantee transfer of data
among all systems
involved in imaging, planning and dose delivery
(periodically and after any software or hardware changes).
Physicist, therapist,
or physics assistant
Physicist Second physicist to
review
IGRT, image-guided radiation therapy; IMRT, intensity modulated radiation therapy; MLC, multileaf collimator; QA, quality assurance; TPS, treatment
planning system.
194 J.M. Moran et al Practical Radiation Oncology: July-September 2011of the IMRT team. There are numerous situations (eg, a
change in the patient geometry) that can lead to restarting
the process from the beginning, which can cause
pressures to skip or short-circuit QA procedures. Risks
may also increase if inadequate time is allotted for, and in
between, the various steps (eg, image segmentation,
written directive, planning, patient-specific QA). The full
length report discusses many of these time considerations
(with respect to safety) in detail.IMRT guidance for quality assurance
experience: technical considerations
A summary of the existing guidance documents for
IMRT is presented in the full length document (text and
Table 5 available online only at www.practicalradonc.
org). These earlier IMRT QA documents emphasized
establishing a quality IMRT program and did not explicitly
concentrate on the potential for catastrophic failures in
IMRT delivery. In fact, several documents suggested that
some QA efforts could be decreased or even eliminated
after the accumulation of a stated amount of experience. In
this work, we acknowledge that certain types of cata-
strophic failures resulting from human error and equip-
ment (hardware or software) malfunction might not be
predictable based on past experience. In some situations,
periodic testing alone may be inadequate for identifying
these types of problems.
The processes and tasks performed by the IMRT team
are addressed with special attention to patient safety and to
minimizing the potential for catastrophic failures. The full
length document (available online only at www.practical-
radonc.org) includes a detailed discussion of the following
with respect to patient safety and quality:
4.2.1 Training
4.2.2 Commissioning an IMRT system
4.2.3 Establishing a QA program
4.2.4 Pretreatment IMRT QA program
4.2.5 Monitoring the IMRT program
Each institution should have clear criteria for a pass or
fail of the IMRT patient-specific IMRT QA technique.There is interinstitutional variation in the content of
pretreatment IMRT QA, as well as the equipment and
software used. There is no formal consensus on the
desired or required level of agreement between the
planned or expected calculation and the measured data
for patient-specific IMRT QA. Also, the impact of failing
to meet a given set of criteria on these patient-specific
measurements is often not explicitly addressed (eg,
remeasure the fields, generate an alternate plan, estimate
the clinical impact qualitatively, etc). Therefore, further
guidance is needed from national organizations in each of
these areas.
Until formal guidance is available, we recommend
that users establish acceptance criteria that they have
determined will identify plans that should fail the QA
check. For example, users should deliberately create
plans with known errors such as the incorrect fluence for
regions of high or low dose across the irradiated volume
or critical structures, plans with one field with a rotated
collimator and/or an incorrect fluence distribution, and
other discrepancies that should be identified by the QA
method. The IMRT QA criteria should be established
using tests of the most highly modulated fields that are
seen in the local clinic.
The full length report includes a summary of the
primary recommendations, tasks, and assigned personnel
to guard against catastrophic failures for IMRT, primarily
concentrating on multileaf collimator-based delivery
systems since they are the most common (Table 4).Collaboration between users and
manufacturers to improve IMRT safety
Improvements in IMRT equipment and methods to
enhance patient safety are needed and would be facilitated
by collaborative efforts between manufacturers, users, and
regulatory agencies such as the United States Food andDrug
Administration. The full length report includes a detailed list
of possible improvements, including the following:
A. Methods to directly and independently verify or
validate patient plan and treatment data on the
Safety considerations for IMRT 195Practical Radiation Oncology: July-September 2011treatment machine prior to, during, and after radiation
delivery.
B. Provision of safety measures in the IMRT workflow
such as communication features, checklists, data
integration and tracking.
C. Integration of IMRT sub-systems andQAprocedures
D. Human interaction with equipment
Successful improvements to existing and future sys-
tems will require joint efforts by the users, vendors, and
regulators. The prioritization, implementation, testing, and
commercial release of any improvements should be a
partnership between users, manufacturers, and regulators.
Summary
IMRT is time and resource intensive. Environmental
and technical concerns need to be addressed to improve
patient safety. Timely treatment is important, but undue
pressure and real-time changes to the treatment plan can
lead to errors. The report suggests use of a “forced time
out” to assure adequate time to perform reviews and QA at
key points in the process. Team members need to
acknowledge that initiation of treatment may need to be
delayed to allow time for necessary QA checks and
subsequent investigations of problems.
The recommendations in the full length report are
intended to provide guidance to aid clinics in avoiding
catastrophic errors and to improve the safety and quality of
care for patients receiving IMRT. It is expected that there
will be further developments with respect to the evaluation
of IMRT programs for accreditation, and that new
guidance documents will continue to enhance the quality
and safety of IMRT use.
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